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THE CHARTER AND ANGLOPHONE
LEGAL THEORY
Richard F. Devlin*
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has generated not only new terrain over which
discursive positions are mobilized, but it has
catalysed theoretical reflection about law, society,
state, and the self. Examining the implications of
the Charter for Anglophone legal theory, the
author conducts both a qualitative and quantita
tive survey ofjurisprudential work on the Charter
and concludes that the Charter's impact on legal
theory has been significant. The Charter has
prompted expansion of the range of interdisciplin
ary influences, contextualized theoretical reflec
tion, and made jurisprudence more engaged with
and relevant to Canadian social life. The Charter
also has facilitated a fragmentation or "jurispru
dential pluralism, " reflective of underlying shifts
in Canadian political discourse. The Charter's
most significant impact, however, will have been
its impetus to transform theoretical engagement
with the law in directions far removed from the
stale confines of analytical positivism.

Non seulement la Charte canadienne des droiis et
libertes a-t-elle cree un terrain nouveau OU Les
positions discursives se mobilisent, mais elle
catalyse egalement la reflexion theorique sur le
droit, la societe, l'Etat et le soi. L'auteur examine
les implications de la Charte pour la theorie
juridique anglophone. Au terme d'une enquete
qualitative et quantitative des travaux jurispru
dentiels en la matiere, ii conclut que la Charte
exerce une influence determinante sur la doctrine.
La Charte a contribue a elargir considerablement
la portee des influences interdisciplinaires, a
contextualiser la reflexion theorique et a rehaus
ser la pertinence de la jurisprudence en regard de
la vie sociale canadienne. La Charte a egalement
facilite une certainefragmentation du « pluralisme
jurisprudentiel », a ['image des changements sous
jacents du discours politique canadien. L'impact
majeur de la Charte, cependant, reside dans
L'incitation au changement qu'elle exerce sur
/'engagement theorique avec la Loi, bien au-dela
des perspectives etriquees du positivisme analy
tique.

• Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Visiting Professor, McGill Law School ( 19951996). This paper originally was commissioned as part of the Centre for Constitutional
Studies' project on the impact of the Charter. The papers in that research project have since
been collected in Charting the Consequences: The Impact of the Charter on Canadian Law
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) edited by D. Schneiderman and
K. Sutherland. Due to a number of circumstances (mostly because of delay), this paper does
not appear in the collection, but is being published separately. Special thanks to Alexandra
Dobrowolsky, Helene Lajeunesse, Kevin Peterson, Dianne Pothier, and an anonymous
reviewer for their assistance in helping me complete this essay. The review is current to
December 1995.
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Constitutional litigation ought not to be seen as a barren exercise of statutory interpretation
.... The legal community must assist the courts by working to develop a theoretical
framework of constitutional principles.
Brian Dickson C.J. 1
The process of the production of modern legal systems is part of an ongoing production of
social life. A country's jurisprudence is a specific representation of a socially constructed
order of things - a construction that is not the prerogative of ruling classes or of men, but
which is struggled for, negotiiited, compromised and redirected every step of the way.
V. Kerruish2

ON METHOD - JURISPRUDENTOLOGY

I.

It is a commonplace for academics to convince themselves of the necessity
of writing a paper and, then, when they come to work on it sometime later, to
discover that they are unclear both as to what they might want to say and, even
more frustratingly, how they might begin to embark on the process of
discovering what they want to say. This sense of paralysis when it comes to
method, while common among scholars from many disciplines, is I think
particularly acute for legal academics for two interconnected reasons. First, as
the Arthurs Report in its (in)famous diagrammatic way revealed, the vast
majority of legal scholarship in Canada has tended to be in the genre of black
letter, doctrinal exposition. 3 As a result, while such an approach clearly involves
a method, more often than not such a method is simply assumed to be the right
way of going about things and, therefore, requiring of no further reflection.
Secondly, relative to most other academic disciplines, common law legal
scholars historically have had short periods of graduate legal training and,
therefore, have had little opportunity to consider questions of method. We have
tended to be a ')ust do it" sort of discipline. While having certain advantages (at
least in terms of efficiency) such an approach tends to leave us high and dry
when we attempt to do something different.
Such was my own sense when I decided to write an essay on the relationship
between (he Charter and Canadian jurisprudence. In theory, it seemed like a
great idea, but executing such a practice proved to be quite daunting. Thus, the
first step of the process was to consider how one could go about identifying and

2
3

"An Address to the Mid-Winter Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association" Edmonton
(2 February 1985) 13-19.
V. Kerruish, Jurisprudence as Ideology (New York: Routledge, 1991) at 196.
Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada
(Ottawa: Research Council of Canada, 1983) c. 5.
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evaluating the dynamic between legal theory and the Charter. The solution that
I have come up with can be captured in a fancy new term that describes a fairly
simple idea: 'jurisprudentology." An "-ology" is a short hand way of saying "the
study of something," in the sense of sociology, archaeology or theology.
Jurisprudentology is the study of jurisprudence and, therefore, assumes that there
is in fact a practice called jurisprudence. Consequently, there is a distinction to
be drawn between doing jurisprudence and thinking about jurisprudence.
Phrased somewhat more philosophically, this can be considered analogous to the
distinction between "theory" and "metatheory." Thus, this essay is an attempt to
think about legal theory.4
But before we can get to jurisprudentology, it will probably be helpful to say
a little more about the term "jurisprudence," as well as the nomination "legal
theory" which, as the reader will have noticed, I use interchangeably.
ON THE PARAMETERS OF LEGAL THEORY

II.

In this section, I want to make a few preliminary comments about the nature,
scope, and methods of legal theory. However, it is to be noted that what follows
4

It is to be noted, however, that although I think I might have created a neologism, I am
certainly not claiming to be the first to think about jurisprudence. Jurisprudentology is
frequently practised, both explicitly and implicitly. For example, on the explicit level,
there are reviews by S. Boyd & E. Sheehy on feminist legal theory ["Feminist
Perspectives on Law: .Canadian Theory and Practice" ( 1986) 2 C.J.W.L. 1], F.
DeCoste's tentative ruminations on the politics of legal theory ['Taking a Stand: Theory
in the Canadian Legal Academy" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 941], RA. MacDonald's early
assessment of Charter jurisprudence ["Postscript and Prelude - the Jurisprudence of
the Charter: Eight theses" (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 321] and M. Gold's reflections on
constitutional scholarship ["Constitutional Scholarship in Canada" ( 1985) 23 Osgoode
Hall L. J. 495; M. Gold, "Moral and Political Theories in Equality Rights Adjudication"
in J. Weiler & R: Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: Tlie Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 85]. See also R. Shiner,
"Jurisprudence: Ideology or Analysis?" (1993) 8 Can. J. Law & Soc. 205 and R. Case,
"Theorizing about Law" (1993) 6 Can. J. Law & Jur. 1 13.
On the implicit level, to the extent that much legal theory critically engages in
debate with other legal theories, frequently by demanding that they be more self
reflective about their own assumptions and aspirations, it is also an exercise in
jurisprudentology. See, for example, J. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social
Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Or What You Need)" in R. Devlin,
ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at
445; B. Etherington, "An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the
Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685; or
D. Herman, "The Good, the Bad, and the Smugly: Perspectives on the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 14 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 589.
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should not be conceived of as an attempt to provide a single comprehensive
definition of legal theory for such closure, even if it were possible, would be
undesirable in that it would attempt to impose parameters on a practice that is
always in the process of becoming.
Jurisprudence, drawing on its latin origins, can be understood as wisdom
about law.5 More specifically, and supplementing in a crucially important way
Catharine MacKinnon' s insight,6 jurisprudence is theory about the relationship
· between law, life, and death. Theory is one technique, one approach, by which
we can seek to achieve wisdom. More precisely, by theory I mean the active
process (theorizing) of self-consciously making explicit and reflectively
interrogating: a) the underlying presumptions; b) the methodological
assumptions; c) the definitional boundaries; d) the procedural norms; e) the
criteria for validity; and f) the preferred justifications for any or all of these in
relation to a social or intellectual phenomenon.
If one raises an explicitly jurisprudential point, a common reaction is what
might be described as theory phobia, a response that may reflect either a concern
by another as to their own inability to think on the theoretical level or,
alternatively, a rolling of the eyes in the -expectation of unintelligible
abstractionism that has little practical relevance. The first response sometimes
engenders disengagement and silence, the second disparagement and even
hostility. While theory can suffer from the vices of intellectual elitism and naval
gazing (a.k.a. theoreticism), it need not necessarily do so. A great deal of the
· problem, I think, depends upon what we mean by abstraction. If it is taken to
mean obscurity, then it seems to me that scepticism is warranted. If, however,
abstraction is understood as simply the ability to stand back from the minutiae
of an intellectual or social phenomenon - law, for example - in order to be
able to develop some reflective perspective on that phenomenon, then I think
that the scepticism is unwarranted.
Moreover, it is important not to confuse abstraction with decontextualism,
that is, the process whereby one attempts to isolate phenomena from their
(in)formative environment in order to attain a clearer, or at least less

6

It can of course be understood in other ways. Frequently, the collective case law of a
jurisdiction is described as jurisprudence. As will become clear, this is not the sense in
which I propose to use the word, though clearly every case. is premised upon
jurisprudential assumptions.
C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of The State (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1989) at 237.
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contaminated, understanding of the nature of the phenomenon. While
decontextualization can be one theoretical strategy, so too can contextualism, the
process of locating phenomena in their relational affinity to other influential
forces. For example, if we understand law as a social phenomenon, a
decontextualist theory may seek to consider it as distinct from other factors such
as history, politics or sociology as, for example, in Kelsen's pure theory of law. 7
On the other hand, it is possible to adopt a contextual approach to law to argue
that law can only be understood in its relationship to the class relations of a
society or, in Marxist terms, through the grid of historical materialism. 8
Similarly, feminist method suggests that jurisprudence must be attentive to the
specificities of women's conditions.9 In other words, certain forms of theory do
factor in the relationship between the general and the particular, the abstract and
the concrete.
Furthermore, even if one wants to retain a healthy scepticism about the utility
of theory, it is to my mind at the very minimum a necessary evil. Because there
is no such thing as presuppositionless thought or practice, there is always a need
for reflection on the significance of stances adopted, be they intellectual or
practical. To borrow a metaphor from Alison Young, forms of legal analysis that
are dismissive of theory find themselves "in the middle of an uncharted
theoretical ocean." 10 A self-conscious legal analysis is a reflective mode of
analysis, one that is willing to interrogate its own assumptions, orientation and
practices.

In sum, in this essay I want to invoke an enlarged or expansive conception

of legal theory, one that recognizes jurisprudence as a multi-dimensional and
multi-tiered interrogative process in the pursuit of a greater understanding of the
nature and functions of law, which itself must be understood as a complex,
controversial, and problematic phenomenon. This emphasis on the interrogative
dimension is important because it emphasizes that in theory the process of
questioning is just as important as the results attained. And the sort of questions
that are asked might include: What is the nature of law? What sort of roles or
functions do law, legal institutions, legal rules and legal procedures fulfill in
7
8

9

10
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H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
J. Fudge, ''Marx's Theory of History and a Marxist Analysis of Law" in Devlin, supra
note 4 at 151; M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Thompson, 1994) at 353, 395-97, 425.
M. Eberts et al., The Case for Women's Equality: The Federation of Women Teachers'
Associations of Ontario and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto:
FWTAO, 1991).
A. Young, Femininity in Dissent (New York: Routledge, 1990) at 156.
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society? How does law fulfill those functions? How important is law in a
society? Which perspectives, overtly or covertly, inform legal institutions, rules
or procedures?
However, an expansive conception of legal theory should not be mistaken for
the claim that we are all jurisprudes now. While I do not want to repeat the
d�:mgers of turf patrolling inherent in a thesis such as The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined, 11 to conceive of all legal scholarship as of
jurisprudential significance would result in an analytically unhelpful over
inflation. In this sense, it may be easier to suggest what is not within the realm
of legal theory: classical, formalistic, and expository doctrinal analysis that sees
its task as being exclusively the systematic reorganization of case law into some
sort of cohesive structure, designed in the main for the benefit of a busy
practising bar. 12 Thus, a desire for explanation rather than mere description is a
necessary, if insufficient, benchmark for inclusion in the realm of jurisprudence.
By way of example, my expansive definition of legal theory might encompass
Cooper Stephenson's. Charter Damages Claims 1 3 and Fitzgerald's
Understanding Charter Remedies: A Practitioner's Guide 14 but not Hogg's
Constitutional Law of Canada15 or Finkelstein and Rogers' Charter Issues in
Civil Cases. 16 And this is no paltry exclusion for doctrinal exegesis is still the
preferred domain of many legal scholars as is evidenced, for example, by the
seventy-eight page bibliography in Beaudoin and Ratushny's The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 17

II

12

13
14
15
16
17

J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Noonday Press,
1965).
This is not intended as a critique of this form of scholarship, for undoubtedly such work
serves valuable purposes. My point is simply that this type of scholarship is not a form
of jurisprudence, although to my mind all scholarship is premised upon certain
jurisprudential assumptions. As Northrop has argued:
To be sure, there are lawyers judges and even law professors who tell us that
they have no legal philosophy. In law, as in other things, we shall find that the
only difference between a person without a philosophy and someone with a
philosophy is that the latter knows what his [sic] philosophy is.
See F. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience (Toronto: Little,
Brown and Company, 1959) at 6.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
(Toronto: Carswell, 1994).
P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carsw'ell, 1992).
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989).
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Finally, it should be acknowledged at the outset that in order to render the
project manageable, there are at least three limitations that significantly
circumscribe the scope and ambitions of this essay. First, there is no attempt to
provide a comparative or longitudinal analysis of the development of Canadian
constitutional theory. 18 Second, the focus is primarily on legal academics who
write in relation to the Charter and, therefore, I have tended to marginalize the
important contributions of scholars from other disciplines. Third, and most
problematically, due to my own inability to read French, I have concentrated on
anglophone scholars.
Having outlined some caveats and methodological points, I am now in a
position to begin to analyze the relationship between the Charter and the recent
developments of Anglophone legal theory in Canada. Two modes of analysis are
adopted. First, I develop a somewhat cursory quantitative review of Canadian
legal scholarship to assess the amount of Charter-oriented legal theory being
produced in Canada. Second, and more significantly, I pursue a qualitative
evaluation of the types of Charter analysis and their jurisprudential orientation.
To achieve this latter task I propose to borrow - or perhaps more accurately to
hijack - and modify a structure of analysis, a taxonomy even, first articulated
over twenty years ago by Bill Twining in an article entitled "Some Jobs for
Jurisprudence" and, subsequently, reworked on several occasions since then. 19
Twining argues that there are at least five functions20 or tasks for jurisprudence
to fulfil: the pursuit of intellectual history; a conduit function; the construction
18

19

20
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But see, for example, Gold, supra note 4 at 495, and R. Yalden, "Liberalism and
Canadian Constitutional Law: Tensions in an Evolving Vision of Liberty" (1988) 47
U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 132.
W. Twining, "Some Jobs for Jurisprudence" ( 1974) 1 Brit. J. Law & Soc. 149;
"Evidence and Legal Theory" in W. Twining, ed., Legal Theory and Common Law
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at 62; W. Twining & N. MacCormick, "Theory in
the Law Curriculum" ibid. at 238. There are, of course, other structures available for
analyzing legal theory. However, most of these adopt a "schools of thought"
methodology. For the purposes of this paper, I find Twining' s approach more helpful
in that it allows for a discussion of the forms ofjurisprudence as well as the substance
somewhat more readily than the schools of thought approach. Having said this, I
acknowledge that every analytical structure is contingent and that some readers may not
agree with every categorization that ensues. What is offered is a modest attempt to make
sense of an enormous and rapidly expanding literature.
I realize that the very mention of the term "function" may ring alarm bells for some
readers. There is no suggestion in this paper that these are the only functions of legal
theory or that such approaches are structurally predetermined by some systemic
imperative. The word is used in the spirit of much of this · paper, in a fairly
straightforward way, as simply a cognate for ''job," rather than as a term of theoretical
art.

Revue d'etudes constitutionnelles

Richard F. Devlin

26

of high theory; the development of theories of the middle order and working
theories; and a synthesizing function. 2 1 To these I will add a sixth task for
jurisprudence: an ideological function.
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Ill.

On a quantitative level, legal theoretical scholarship seems to have
experienced a significant growth over the last decade or so. First, there have been
a relatively large number of monographs focusing either exclusively or primarily
on the Charter published in the last ten years. 22 There have been at least an
equally large number of edited collections23 and symposia24 with the same
21

22

23

See "Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 1 9 at 1 60; also see "Evidence and Legal
Theory," supra note 19 at 64.
D. Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code
(Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 1987); D. Beatty, The Canadian
Production of Constitutional Review: Talking Heads and the Supremes (Toronto:
Carswell, 1 990); D. Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1 995); W. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of
Litigation and the Social and Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1 994); K. Cooper Stevenson, supra note 13; M. Eberts et al., supra note 9;
Fitzgerald, supra note 14; D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: General Principles,
(Calgary: Carswell, 1 986); D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights
(Calgary: Carswell, 1990); D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and
Gay Legal Equality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 994); A. Hutchinson,
Waiting For CoraJ- A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1995); Mandel, supra note 8; M. Manning, Rights, Freedoms and the Courts: A
Practical Analysis of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1983);
P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme
Court of Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1 99 1 ); L. Trakman, Reasoning With the
Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1992); J. Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language,
Culture, Community and the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill University
Press, 1994). B. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and
Scope ofJudicial Review, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1 988) might also be added
given the incorporation of Charter issues.
J. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution: Perspectives
on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992); A. Bayefsky
& M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Agincourt: Carswell, 1985); C. Beckton & W. MacKay, eds., The Courts and the
Charter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 985); G. Beaudoin, ed., Charter Cases
1986-1987 (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1 987); G. Beaudoin, ed., Your Clients and the
Charter: Liberty and Equality (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1987); G. Beaudoin, ed., As
the Charter Evolves (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1989); G. Beaudoin, ed., The Charter:
Ten Years Later (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, .1992); Beaudoin & Ratushney, supra note
17; C. Boyle et al., Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto: Carswell, 1986);
P. Bryden et al., eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: University of Toronto
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emphasis. Moreover, several new journals have surfaced some which are
explicitly jurisprudential,25 others of which are heavily influenced by legal
theoretical concerns.26 Finally, other new journals have sprung up with a heavy
focus on Charter analysis. 27
To this extent, it can be said there is at least some parallel between growth
of jurisprudential analysis and Charter scholarship. However, on a qualitative
level it would seem impossible to draw any causal connection between the
growth of legal theory and Charter talk.
First, a review of a journal such as Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence suggests that, in fact, the Charter has had relatively little impact.
Despite special issues on collective rights, equality rights and law and sexuality,
the preference seems to be for quite positivistic and highly abstracted analyses
very much· in the oxonian tradition. Particular favourites seem to include
Dworkin, Finnis, Hart, Rawls and Raz.28 Similarly, the interdisciplinary
Canadian Journal of Law and Society and Journal of Human Justice, while

24

25
26

27
28

Press, 1994 ); C.I.A.J.·, The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms (Cowansville:
Yvon Blais, 1983); Canadian Human Rights Foundation, ed., Multiculturalism and the
Charter: A Legal Perspective (Toronto: Carswell, 1987); K. Mahoney & S. Martin,
eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto; Carswell, 1987); D. Schneiderman, ed.,
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Calgary: Thompson, 1991); R. Sharpe, ed.,
Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths 1987); L. Smith, et al., Righting the
Balance: Canada 's New Equality Rights (Saskatoon: C.H.R.R., 1986); K. Swinton, ed.,
Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech Lake Accord (Toronto: Carswell, 1988);
W. Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A
Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982); Weiler & Elliot, supra note 4.
(1983) 61 · can. Bar Rev.; Charter Edition (1982) 16 U.B.C. L. Rev.; The New
Constitution and the Charter: Background, Analysis and Commentary (1982) 8 Queen's
L. J. 7; Labour Law and The Charter (1988) 13 Queen's L. J.; The Loss of Innocence:
Coming to Terms with the Charter ( 1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 447; E. Belobaba & E.
Gertner, eds., The New Constitution and the Charter of Rights: Fundamental Issues and
Strategies (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.; The Charter: Initial Experience, Emerging Issues,
Future Challenges (1983) 13 Man. L. J. 427; Critical Perspectives on the Constitution
(1982) 4 Socialist Studies; B. Strayer, Life Under the Canadian Charter: Adjusting the
Balance Between Legislatures and Courts (1988) Public Law 347.
See, for example, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence.
See, for example, Canadian Journal of Law & Society and the Journal of Human
Justice. See also the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, which was first
published in 1 985, the year the equality provisions came into force.
See, for example, Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, Constitutional Forum, National
Journal of Constitutional Law and the Review of Constitutional Studies.
It is to be noted that in 1995, it added a new subtitle: An International Journal of Legal
Thought.
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hospitable to Charter issues, have been quite wide ranging in their
jurisprudential coverage. Moreover, the Charter seems to have had little impact
on the scholarship of some of Canada's most established jurists, for example,
Professors Weinrib and Trebilcock.
However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of the
Charter. The Review of Constitutional Studies and the National Journal of
Constitutional Law, for example, have published a significant number of articles
that manifest a subtle (and quite readable) blend of theory and doctrine.
Moreover, conventional law reviews have devoted a great deal of space to
literally hundreds of fairly reflective articles on the Charter. Thus, one pattern
that seems to be emerging is that although Charter-oriented legal theory has not
(thankfully) occupied the field of the explicitly theoretical journals, it has had a
significant impact on the broad spectrum of legal journals. Further, leading
jurists have been unable to resist the allure of the Charter, for example, Bill
Conklin29 and J.C. Smith.30 Moreover, it might also be suggested that while the
scholarship of many traditional jurists tends to begin with conceptualism and
then, perhaps, to work its way down to the practical concerns of law, others
(perhaps of a younger generation) begin their scholarship with pressing and
immediate issues and through a process of .reflection and argument work their
way up to theory. 3 1 In this light, rather than suggesting that the Charter has
caused a growth in legal theory, it can be understood as a terrain of discursive
practice that serves as both a forum and catalyst for legal theoretical reflection.
IV.

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Quantitative analyses, while helpful, can only provide a very limited
snapshot of the potential relationship between the Charter and anglophone legal
theory. What is required is a more qualitative analysis, one that is able to map
the contours of the jurisprudential terrain. As mentioned earlier, a slightly
modified application of Twining's topography can provide the tools required.

29
30
31

W. Conklin, Images of a Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
J.C. Smith, The Neurotic Foundations of Social Order: Psychoanalytic Roots of
Patriarchy (New York: New York University Press, 1990).
See, for example, M. Jackman, "The· Protection of Welfare Rights under the Charter"
(1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257; L. Phillips, & M. Young, "Sex, Tax and the Charter: A
Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada" ( 1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 221. Other examples
which I shall return to later in the text might include feminist reflections on the
significance of s. 15 and arguments by some First Nations scholars on the dangers of
the rights orientation of the Charter.
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A. Constructing Intellectual History
Twining, while acknowledging that it is not a task that is unique to legal
theory, argues that the pursuit of intellectual history entails "the systematic study
and criticism of the heritage of legal thought and critical study of the work of
individual thinkers. "32 While there has been some work by Canadian legal
theorists in developing this sort of work,33 not surprisingly the Charter has had
little influence given its recent vintage. The closest we come is perhaps some
scholarship in symposia for retiring Supreme Court judges such as DicksonC.J. 34
and Wilson J.35 or general overviews of the various stances commentators have
taken in relation to the Charter. 36
B. Conduit Function
Twining argues that jurisprudence has "centrifugal tendencies" in the sense
that jurists have a proclivity to inquire into and draw upon the insights of other
intellectual disciplines and environments. In this light, the role of the jurist is to
serve as a bridge between law and something else. In my opinion, such a
function can be fulfilled in one of two ways: jurisprudence as assimilation and
jurisprudence as an interpretive grid. Twining himself seems only to recognize
the first.
In terms of the assimilationist approach, Twining argues that the role of the
jurist is to "venture forth ... [and] bring back the ideas, techniques, and insights
of [another] discipline and to integrate or assimilate them into the intellectual
milieu of the law. "37 It is to be noted that such an approach seems to be premised
'
32
33

34

35

36

37

"Evidence and Legal Theory," supra note 19 at 64.
See, for example, G.B. Baker, 'Toe Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought
in the Late-Victorian Empire" (1985) 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 219; Conklin, supra note 29;
J. Crimmins, '"A Hatchet for Paley's Net' : Bentham on Capital Punishment and Judicial
Discretion" ( 1988) Can. J. Law & Jur. 63; D. Patterson, ed., Legal Theory and
Wittgensteinian Thought (1990) 3 Can. J. Law & Jur. 3 ; R. Vipond, Liberty and
Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure ofthe Constitution (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1991).
R. Penner, "Introduction: The Dickson Legacy , The Legacy of a Judicial Humanist"
(199 1) 20 Man. L. J. 263.
The Democratic Intellect ( 1992) 15 Dalhousie L. J. ; see also R.E. Hawkins & R.
Martin, "Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson" (1996) 41 McGill L. J. 1 .
See, for example, J. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy
in Canadian Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L. J. 123; Etherington,
supra note 4.
"Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 19 at 157.
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upon strong assumptions as to the nature and parameters of law. In that sense it
tends to presume that law itself is unproblematic. Moreover, it constructs
jurisprudence as an active subject and other intellectual genres as passive
objects, waiting to be press-ganged into the service of legal theory. Such an
assumption has resulted in the familiar paradigm of "law and ..." approaches,
with corresponding charges of intellectual imperialism (and na'ivete).
The interpretive grid approach is somewhat more self-reflective and modest
in its ambitions. It recognizes that legal theory is a form of intellectual practice,
but one that may be potentially enriched through an egalitarian engagement with
other intellectual disciplines. In this approach, jurisprudence is understood as a
framework of analysis that is both latently enlightening and necessarily partial,
in the sense of incomplete. Within this approach, law itself is recognized to be
a problematic category of analysis that is up for grabs. The agenda in this
approach is not one of the assimilation of other disciplines, but constructive, if
mutually critical, explorations.
There appears to be ample evidence of this interdisciplinary turn in Charter
jurisprudence.38 References to, and adaptations of, anthropology, economics,
literary criticism, philosophy, political theory, rhetoric, semiotics, sociology,
social theory, and even social psychology and psychoanalysis are rampant.
Indeed, it almost seems de rigueur to at least footnote some non-legal thinker or
tradition whose insights lay the foundation for what the Charter jurist has to
offer.
Moreover, I would suggest that, as Charter-oriented jurisprudence has
sought out interlocutors over the last decade or so, there has been a shift from
philosophy - particularly in its positivistic and analytical mode - to social
theory - particularly in its progressive modes. 39 In other words, the focus is not
38

39

For an early exhortation to engage in interdisciplinary work see N. Lyon, "The
Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Freedoms Guarantee: What to do with Vague
but Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 57.
For a particularly clear example, see the excellent debate between Fudge and Glasbeek
and Herman. [ J. Fudge & H. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics with Little
Class" (1992) 1 Soc. & L. Stud. 45; D. Herman, "Beyond the Rights Debate" (1993)
2 Soc. & L. Stud. 25]. See also L. Clark, "Liberalism ahd the Living-Tree: Women,
Equality, and the Charter' (1990) 28 Alta. L. Rev. 384; M. Eaton, "Lesbians, Gays and
the Struggle for Equality Rights: Reversing the Progressive Hypothesis" (1994) 17
Dalhousie L. J. 130; D. Fraser, "And Now for Something Completely Different:
Judging Interpretation and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 7
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 66; D. Greschner, "Abortion and Democracy for Women:
A Critique of Tremblay v. Daigle" (1990) 35 McGill L. J. 633; Mandel, supra note 8
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so much on the question "what is law?" but more on the question, "what is to be
done with, or about, law?" This transition is particularly apparent in the work of
jurists like J.C. Smith who have shifted from a heavy focus on analytical
positivism40 to "postmodern psychoanalytic theory" with a heavy Freudian
bent,41 or Bill Conklin with his Derridean inspired "image of a constitution"
theory.42
Also of considerable significance is the turn, sometimes implicit but often
explicit, to literary criticism. Many scholars, who emanate from divers� and
often quite contradictory ideological positions, seem to be inspired by their
inquiries into the different approaches to literary criticism. However, despite
these differences, there appears to be widespread consensus that the way to
proceed in a Charter-ized regime is through a colloquy,43 democratic dialogue,44
a postmodern democratic dialogue,45 a distinctively Canadian conversation,46
communicative discourse,47 constitutional dialogue of democratic account
ability,48 a conversation of justification,49 a conversation about rights and roles.50
Sections 1 and 33 are often invoked as exemplars of this dialogic vision. I will
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at 83, 222; Trakman, supra note 22; N. Sargent, "Rethinking the Law and Social
Transformation Debate: Beyond the Correspondence Metaphor" ( 1991) 3 J. Human
Just. 1; C. Stychin, "Essential Rights and Contested Identities: Sexual Orientation and
Equality Rights Jurisprudence in Canada" (1995) 8 Can. J. Law & Jur. 49; B. Weber,
"A Disenchanted Charter? The Common Law Tradition and the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1988) 3 Can. J. Law & Soc. 195.
J.C. Smith, Legal Obligation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976); S.C. Coval
& J.C. Smith, Law and its Presuppositions: Actions, Agents and Rules (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
Supra note 30.
Supra note 29.
A. Bayefsky, "The Judicial Function Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" in A. Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton:
Academic Printers & Publishing, 1988) 121 at 155, 162.
Hutchinson, supra note 22.
C. Stychin, "A Postmodern Constitutionalism: Equality Rights, Identity Politics, and the
Canadian National Imagination" (1994) 17 Dalhousie L. J. 61.
Webber, supra note 22 at 192.
Trakman, supra note 22 at c. 1.
J. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship" (1993) 1 Rev. Const. Studies 1; J.
Nedelsky & C. Scott, "Constitutional Dialogue" in Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note
23 at 59.
Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22 at 5, 53; Talking Heads and the Supremes,
supra note 22 at 25-26.
M. Gold, "Of Rights and Roles: The Supreme Court and the Charter" (I 989) 23
U.B.C.L. Rev. 507.
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have more to say about this apparent faith in dialogism later in the essay, but at
this point I simply want to highlight that almost everyone seems to be doing it.
Moreover, while I clearly believe that the interdisciplinary tum of recent
jurisprudence is an undoubted plus, there is of course the ever-present danger of
dilettantism: the superficial and uncritical borrowing of concepts, interpretive
strategies and methods from other disciplines without sufficient familiarity of the
internal debates or an adequate appreciation as to their pedigree within their own
discipline. Bix, for example, has been very critical of Langille's "misapplication"
and "flouting" of Wittgenstinian ideas.5 1
C. The Construction of High Theory
i)

High Theory Defined

For Twining, "high theory" is essentially "philosophical," it addresses
"fundamental issues," which might include: 52
[ v]ery general questions about the nature and functions of law, the concept of a legal
system, the relationship between law and morality, the differences between law and other
types of social control, perennial questions about justice, and ultimate questions about the
epistemological and other fundamental assumptions of legal discourse ....

Closely connected with the idea of high theory is what, in some circles, is called
conceptualism. Conceptualism is an approach to jurisprudence which, rather than
· considering the law in action, tends to draw on the insights of analytic
philosophy to posit that it is most appropriate to think of law as if it were a
system of ideas or concepts each of which is in need of elucidation. Key
categories of conceptual analysis might include inter alia: right, good, duty,
command, sanction, validity, rule, principle, authority, legitimacy, and
obligation.
Dovetailing with both high theory and conceptualism is an implicit
depoliticization of law. While this is a point I will address in more detail later,
I want to suggest that the philosophical abstraction of high theory, coupled with
the disengagement from social issues engendered by conceptualism, tends to
portray law and legal thinking as somehow autonomous and distinct from the

51
52

B. Bix, "The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein's Rule-Following
Considerations to Legal Theory" ( 1990) 3 Can. J. Law & Jur. 107.
"Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 19 at 158.
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political messiness of law in action.53 Thus, it is suggested that high theory (or
philosophy) is a method of jurisprudence but, unlike legal theory, it is not
coterminous with jurisprudence. 54
Quite a lot of Canadian legal theory operates in the tradition of high theory,
particularly in the pages of the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence.55 At
first blush it would seem that, in the main, the Charter has had little impact in
this sphere except for a passing question as to the pedigree of the Constitution
Act 1 982 in relation to the "rule of recognition."56 But there are perhaps two
exceptions to this suggestion which may have quite a large impact: the post
rationalist turn in jurisprudence and the rights debate.
ii) The Post-Rationalist Turn
The first exception to the proposition that the Charter has not had a great
deal of influence on the practice of high legal theory might be described as the
"post-rationalist" turn in Canadian legal thinking. Historically, most legal
thought has tended to conceive of the rule of law as "an unqualified human
good,"57 as an instrumentality for cogently identifying and resolving societal
problems. For many, the Charter is but another confirmation of law's capacity
to do the right thing, this time by delineating the scope of human rights in
Canada _and the limited circumstances in which they may be thwarted.58
Perhaps the grandest assault on this rational instrumentalist conception of
law comes from J.C. Smith and his argument that our legal order may, in fact,
be driven by a neurotic patriarchal psyche, a juridical unconscious that is
motored by an irrational fear of the other.59 Smith, however, has little to say
about the Charter, although in passing he does appear to suggest that women
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But see F. DeCoste, "Radical Discourse in Legal Theory: Hart and Dworkin" (1989)
2 1 Ottawa. L. Rev. 679.
Evidence and Legal Theory, supra note 19 at 62.
See also L. Green, The Authority of the State (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988); Discussion ( 1982) 2 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 293 et seq.
R. Shiner, "The Acceptance of a Legal System" (1990) 3 Can. J. Law_ & Jur. 81.
E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters; The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane,
1975) at 266.
Gibson, supra note 22 at I .
Smith, supra note 30.
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judges can interpret it in a "different voice" that is more open to diverse needs
of a postmodern society such as Canada. 60
Bill Conklin is less psychoanalytic in his orientation. He urges us to focus
less on the unconscious and more on the conscious images of a constitution that
construct and curtail legal praxis. In the tradition of postmodern epistemology,
Conklin has identified the limits of the various rationalistic strategies - rule
rationalism, policy rationalism, and orthodox rationalism - adopted by lawyers
and judges over the years to neutralize and depoliticize their decision-making.
Rationalism in the service of legal thought has been conceived of as mere
instrumental technique. Through a review of Charter case law at both the
Supreme Court and (unusually for most jurists) at the lower levels he identifies
the perpetuation of such rationalistic legitimation strategies.

In their place, drawing on the scholarship and judgments of Rand J., he calls

for a more "teleological" commitment to decision-making. This mode of legal
reasoning makes explicit one's conception of the good, one's understanding of
social interaction and, most importantly for Conklin, one's theory of the
person: 61
The challenge for the contemporary lawyer is to picture a constitution which allows
him/her to question the "givens," to connect the "givens" universalist human rights claims
reified character when divorced from ·social/cultural
of theory, and to critique their
·
practice.62

· By unpacking such presuppositions Conklin aspires to make legal decision
makers subject to the demands of what he, in contrast to instrumental reason,
calls "critical reason."63 Critical reason insists that one must develop the talent
of self-reflexivity, that one must resist juridical closure and that one must make
explicit one's prejudgments, be they ontological, political or moral. Furthermore,
Conklin argues that the Charter, because of the centrality of the manifestly
contestable concepts of freedom, democracy, liberty, and equality, necessarily
"entertains" and "fosters" such recourse to social, political and moral theory. 64
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J.C. Smith, "Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence and the Limits of Traditional Legal Theory"
in Devlin, supra note 4 at 223.
Conklin refers to two competing theories of the person: first, as a relational, associative
or social being and, second, as an atomistic, lonely, and self-sufficient individual.
Conklin, supra note 29 at 223, 226.
Ibid. at 2 I 8.
Ibid. at 248-52.
Ibid. at 236-65 .
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In other words, legal decision-makers must justify their reasons and, therefore,
be held accountable for the enforcement of their preferred image of the
constitution. In this way, Conklin argues, the nexus between (legal) knowledge
and power is rendered transparent and, thereby, more contestable. 65
Turpel is even more poignant in her challenge to the assumed beneficence
and rationalism of the Charter. Again drawing on the insights of post-analytic
philosophy (this time from a First Nations perspective) she argues that the
Charter has little to do with "the good." Rather, it is a symbol and practice of
cultural and juridical imperialism through which the dominant Canadian culture
continues its colonization of First Nations people who have very different
conceptions of social relations and legal norms.66
iii) The Rights Debate
The second exception where there does appear to be a connection between
high theory and the Charter relates to "rights." Two quite distinct questions are
pertinent. First, there is the debate between those who believe in the utility of a
rights discourse, those who do not, and those who resist dichotomous analyses.67
Secondly, there is the question of whether there can be such a thing as collective
rights or group rights.
The dominant intellectual paradigm in Canadian jurisprudence presumes that
rights, like law, are both natural and unequivocally desirable. Drawing on the
spectre of an unfettered majoritarianism advocates of an entrenched Charter
argue that the more rights we have the better.68 In particular, pride of place is
65

66
67

68

See also Hutchinson, supra note 22 at 22. The discussion in the text outlines the
positive spin which Conklin gives to his postrationalist analysis. However, in other
essays Conklin is much more pessimistic, suggesting that the Charter is yet another
level of ')uridical metalanguage" that enhances the power of lawyers at the expense of
citizen participation. W. Conklin, "'Access to Justice' As Access to a Lawyer's
Language" ( 1990) 10 Windsor Y. B. Access Just. 454.
M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies,
Cultural Differences" in Devlin, supra note 4 at 503.
See also Kerruish, supra note 2 at 14 1. Kerruish's approach is to identify two broad
camps - "mainstream" and "socialist, feminist and critical" - whereas my approach
suggests much less cohesion among her triad of progressives.
See, for example, T. Axworthy, "Colliding Visions: The Debate Over the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms 1 980-81" in Weiler & Elliot, supra note 4 at 13; T. Axworthy,
"Liberalism and Equality" in Mahoney & Martin, supra note 23 at 43; Bayefsky &
Eberts, supra note 23; N. Lyon, supra note 38; J. MacPherson, "Litigating Equality
Rights" in Smith, supra note 23, 23 1 at 232; J. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The
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given to the right to individual liberty.69 Viewed from this perspective, the
juridical history of Canada is one of inexorable (if slow) improvement as we
have moved from a shaky common law regime of inchoate rights, to the statutory
recognition of rights, to the constitutional entrenchment of rights.70 Jurists who
subscribe to such a perspective envision the Charter as a normative and
institutional structure designed to encourage both the courts and the legislators
to maximize human rights7 1 and social justice. 72 However, if there is conflict
between the legislatures and the courts, most rights advocates tend to argue that
the courts should have the last word not only because they are likely to be the
strongest guardians of minority interests,73 but also because the Charter itself
provides objective and determinative right answers.74 Importantly, many rights
theorists emphasize that the judicial enforcement of rights is grounded in
principle, not policy, politics or power.75 The call is for "judicial
statesmanship"76 and constitutional fidelity.77
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Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter" (1983) 13 Man. L. J. 455.
Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22 at c. 6.
See, for example, D. Baker, "The Changing Norms of Equality in the Supreme Court
of Canada" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 497; D. Gibson, Equality, supra note 22 at c. 1 ;
W. Tarnopolsky, "The Evolution o f Judicial Attitudes" in Mahoney & Martin, supra
note 23 at 378; L. Weinrib, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the
Charter" (1988) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 469.
W. Lederman, ''The Power of the Judges and the New Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1982) U .B. C. L. Rev. 1 ; W. Lederman, "Democratic Parliaments,
Independent Courts, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"(l 985) 11
Queen' s L. J. 1 ; P. Monahan & M. Finkelstein, "The Charter of Rights and Public
Policy in Canada" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L. J. 501 at 507; B. Slattery, "A Theory of
the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L. J.7 701; L. Weinrib, "Learning to Live With
the Override" (1990) 35 McGill L. J. 541.
Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22 at x, 10, 88, 182; N. Lyon, "An Essay on
Constitutional Interpretation" 26 Osgoode Hall L. J. 95.
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Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at vi, 114-16; D. Beatty & S. Kennett,
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Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 573.
Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22 at 11-12; M. Gold, "A Principled Approach
to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Enquiry" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 131 ; Lyon, supra
note 38 at 245, 252; Weinrib, supra note 70 at 481-82, 508-13.
D. Gibson, "Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Some
General Considerations" in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin, supra note 23, 25 at 28.
Lyon, supra note 72 at 99.
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Others, however, are unimpressed and advance several arguments against the
ideology and practice of the Charter-ization of rights. 78 First, critics argue that
judicial review is undemocratic because judges are unelected and, therefore, ·
unaccountable. 79 Moreover, they are said to be unreflective of the class, race,
gender, (dis)abilities, sexual orientations or political preferences of Canadian
society-at-large. 80 Particular attention has been focused on the hostility of the
courts to rights claims by unions as manifested in Dolphin Delivery81 and the
right to secondary picket, the Labour Trilogy82 as to whether the freedom to
associate includes a right to strike, and the BCGEu83 case in which the right to
picket, though recognized as a form of expression under section 2(b) could be
justifiably restricted under section 1. 84 Inversely, the courts are identified as
having a pro-business tendency in, for example, their somewhat formalistic and
legalistic recognition of corporations as persons and the correlative entitlement
to a panoply of Charter rights. 85
78

79

80
81
82
83
84
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For an early articulation of some criticisms see R. Samek, "Untrenching Fundamental
Rights" ( 1982) 27 McGill L. J. 755; D. Schmeiser, "The Case Against Entrenchment
of a Canadian Bill of Rights" (1973) 1 Dalhousie L. J. 15. For an early assessment, see
MacDonald, supra note 4.
Some readers may be concerned that the ensuing criticisms cannot really qualify
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extensive with either conceptualism or abstraction. I further suggest that while some of
the arguments of the skeptics reflect a conceptualist theoretical method others are more
contextualist, that is, they attempt to locate an abstract concept, for example "right,"
within formative ideological, material and institutional dynamics. To the extent that
such arguments advance the proposition that concepts like rights are not free floating
but irredeemably embedded in social practices, they can be understood as a form of
high theory.
Bakan, supra note 36 at 169-78; Bakan, supra note 4; Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 1; J.
Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" (1988) 13 Queen's
L. J. 61 at 64, 68-69; Mandel, supra note 8 at c. 2; Monahan, supra note 22 at 29. But
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Bakan, supra note 4.
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Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada,
[ 1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [ 1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
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Labour and Employment Law" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117.
Hutchinson, supra note 22 at 32-34, 150- 5 1; A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter"
( 1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473 at 490-93; E. Sheehy, "Regulatory Crimes and the
Charter: R. v. Wholesale Travel Inc." ( 1992) 3 J. Human Just. 111; C. Tollefson.
"Corporate Constitutional Rights and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1993) 19 Queen's
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Second, and closely related, is the argument that a public preoccupation with
a Charter and rights arguments tends to subordinate and colonize other forms of
political debate and mobilization. Such a dynamic priorizes litigation rather than
participation,86 and reconstructs "citizens" as "petitioners." 1his is com
pounded by the danger that litigational politics tends to catapult lawyers into the
position of a �olitical vanguard, a vanguard that is disconnected from broader
social causes. 8
Third, Charter politics are accused of being elitist in that only the
institutionally well positioned or the affluent can afford to utilize the courts89 the Lavigne90 case is said to have cost the unions about $400,00091 and rumour
has it that LEAF may have spent up to $ 1 million on Andrews.91
Fourth, it is argued that in both form and structure the Charter advances
individualism, consolidates essential capitalist legal relations and undercuts
solidarity and collectivism in that it favours freedom of the individual from state
intervention when a caring society requires such state intervention to equalize
and redistribute social goods.93 Former Chief Justice Dickson's liberal
individualistic prognostications on the purpose of the Charter in Hunter v.
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Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 1 ; J. Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights
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and Freedoms" (1993) 5 Canterbury L. Rev. 207 at 221-25.
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Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia) (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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Y.B. Access Just 128; J. Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social
Transformation?" ( 1990) 5 Can. J. Law. & Soc. 47 at 57; Hutchinson, supra note 22 at
c. 4; Monahan, supra note 22, c. 5-6; A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's
Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45(6) Advocate 857; Webber, supra note 86 at 218-21.
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Southam,94 Big M Drug Mart95 and Oakes96 often are targeted here. 97 Similarly,
there has been much criticism of the Supreme Court's confirmation of the
National Citizens Coalition argument that limitations on third party spending
violated section 2(b) of the Charter because the effect was to enhance the
amount of money that the corporate elite was able to donate to the federal
Progressive Conservative party during the Free Trade election of 1984.98

Fifth, it is argued that the courts are an inappropriate forum for social policy
making because: a) judges are unequipped to deal with large scale social issues;
b) the exceptionalism and specificity of individual cases unduly decontextualizes
the complexity of the issues;99 and c) when legalized, all public social problems
tend to be re-encoded and repackaged as issues of private individual rights which
can only generate zero-sum solutions. 100 Again, labour relations are frequently
cited.
Sixth, due to their abstraction, rights discourse and legal reasoning are
identified as deeply indeterminate and, therefore, capable of diverse
interpretations, depending on the ideological preferences of the interpreters
(judges) and the contexts in which such interpretations are invoked. 101 Moreover,
there is the problem of causal indeterminacy; that is, the long term and broader
social impact of a partirular decision or set of decisions can be extremely
difficult to predict. 102 In short, the symbolism of a "rights victory" may not have
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any concrete social impact and, indeed, may even operate as a form of
deradicalization through partial incorporation. 103
Finally, at least one critic worries that Charter-ized rights can encourage a
unidimensional and stultifying nationalism. 1 04
Dichotomies rarely capture the full panorama of perspectives, 105 and this is
as true of jurisprudentology as it is of any other form of analysis. Thus, it can be
suggested that as distinct from the faithful and the skeptics there may be a third
category of jurists who, very roughly, might be described as the "progressive
deviationists." 106 They are united in a couple of beliefs. First, deviationists accept
that, for better or worse, judicial review is a constitutional fact and that it is,
therefore, essential to focus on what can best be done with this reconfiguration
of social institutions. Second, they argue that rights have no inherent or essential
meaning; rather, they are social constructs that have been imagined and given
concrete form at certain historical conjunctures and, therefore, they are capable
of being remade in the contemporary historical moment. Third, given this
plasticity, rights can be reconceptualized, reinterpreted and rearticulated not
solely as exclusive fences to protect the individual but also as relational and
communitarian interests that entitle citizens to pursue social goods. Fourth,
deviationists argue that such an open-ended vision of rights can allow for
significant differential treatment and an expansive pluralist tolerance in
constructing social, legal, and constitutional policies. Fifth, this pursuit of
difference can be most effectively achieved if citizens and judges conceive of
• rights claims as part of an ongoing mutually empathetic. social conversation.
Unity can be grounded in the accommodation of difference. Sixth, at the level
of strategy, deviationists argue: a) that negative rights are extremely valuable for
those who are still the victims of discrimination; b) that rights generally can
serve as a medium of personal valorization; c) that rights discourse can serve as
a potent form of (counterhegemonic) consciousness-raising, resistance and
mobilization and, therefore, it cannot be abandoned as a potential political
platform; and d) that the achievement of a rights claim can send an important
symbolic message to the broader society. Herman, Nedelsky and Trakman are
103
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probably the most explicit spokespersons for this perspective, 107 but I would
suggest that it also informs the legal philosophy of many feminists, 108 self
described egalitarian liberals, 1 09 and some post-liberals. 1 1 0
The debate between rights advocates, critics, and progressive deviationists
continues unabated and, as we shall see, underpins several other forms of
jurisprudential analysis. However, before addressing these issues there is a
second aspect of the rights debate that is pertinent to the realm of high theory:
the controversy over the validity and vitality of group rights.
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Specifically, section 1 5 (the equality provisions), sections 16-23 (language
rights), section 25 (aboriginal rights), section 27 (multiculturalism) and section
28 (women's rights) have been hotly contested Charter provisions. So too have
been proposals for a Social Charter. While some argue that group rights are
nonsensical because a group is indeterminate,111 others point to the needs of
native,112 multicultural, 113 and minority language 114 communities to argue that
collective rights are both defensible and that they fulfill an important
constitutional function. Problematized by cases such as Societe des Acadiens, 115
Ford v. Quebec (A. -G.) 1 16 and Sparrow,117 as well as the draft legal text of the
Charlottetown Accord, many legal philosophers provide us with a steady, and
sometimes sustaining, diet of conceptual distinctions that operate at various
levels of description and abstraction: individualism and communitarianism; 118
liberalism and communitarianism;119 history-based groupism and liberal
individualism; 120 hostile liberalism, moderately sceptical liberalism and
sympathetic liberalism; 121 duality and multiculturalism; 122 multiculturalism,

Ill
1 12

113
114

115
116
117
I 18
119
120
121
122

B. Schwartz, "Individuals, Groups and Canadian Statecraft" in Devlin, supra note 4 at
39.
D. Johnston, "Nati've Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self
Preservation" (1989) 2 Can. J. Law & Jur. 19; M. McDonald, "Should Communities
Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law & Jur. 217;
W. Pentney, ''The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and the Constitution Act
1982: Part 1 - The Interpretive Prism of Section 25" ( 1988) 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 21,
"Part 2 - Section 35: The Substantive Guarantee" (1988) 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 207.
J. Magnet, "Multiculturalism and Collective Rights: Approaches to Section 27" in
Beaudoin & Ratushney, supra note 17 at 739.
M. Bastarache, ed., Language Rights in Canada (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1987); D.
Reaume, "Language Rights, Remedies, and the Rule of Law" (1988) 1 Can. J. Law &
Jur. 35, and "Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 1 ;
L. Green & D. Reaume, "Education and Linguistic Security in the Charter" (1989) 34
McGill L. J. 777.
(1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 406 (S.C.C.).
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 7 12.
(1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 263 (S.C.C.).
MacDonald, supra note 112; Monahan, supra note 22 at 1 1 1-113.
E. Mendes, "Two Solitudes, Freedom of Expression and Collective Linguistic Rights
in Canada: A Case Study of the Ford Decision" (1991) 1 N.J.C.L. 283.
Schwartz, supra note 1 1 1.
MacDonald, supra note 1 12.
J. Magnet, "The Charter 's Official Languages Provisions: The Implications of
Entrenched Bilingualism" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 163 .

Vol. IV, No. I
Review of Constitutional Studies

